失真和最優(yōu)激勵合同的風(fēng)險[外文翻譯]

包括中文翻譯和英文原文

中文：6345字
英文：23500字符


失真和最優(yōu)激勵合同的風(fēng)險
喬治．貝克

摘要：績效測量是任何激勵機制設(shè)計的重要組成部分。誠信企業(yè)的激勵機制和組織中的價值是所可用的措施的強烈表現(xiàn)。然而，對有價值的性能措施的特點還沒有充分探討了文學(xué)社。在本文中，我使用一個多任務(wù)模型發(fā)展措施的效能兩個參數(shù)表征，并顯示如何將-兩個參數(shù)扭曲風(fēng)險價值和影響使用性能的措施在激勵合同。我表明，在現(xiàn)實世界中設(shè)計許多有復(fù)雜的問題且卓有成效的激勵合同，可視為貿(mào)易這兩個功能的取舍性能的措施。我也使用這個框架來分析在提供獎勵的一些特定的環(huán)境，包括研發(fā)實驗室和非營利組織



Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts.
George Baker
Forthcoming, Journal of Human Resources
Abstract：Performance measurement is an essential part of the design of any incentive system. The strength and value of incentives in organizations are strongly affected by the performance measures available. Yet, the characteristics of valuable performance measures have not been well explored in the agency literature. In this paper, I use a multi-task model to develop a two-parameter characterization of performance measures and show how these two parameters distortion and risk affect the value and use of performance measures in incentive contracts. I show that many complex issues in the design of real world incentive contracts can be fruitfully viewed as trade-offs between these two features of performance measures. I also use this framework to analyze the provision of incentives in several specific environments, including R&D labs and non-profit organizations.
1. Introduction
The provision of incentives to individuals and groups in organizations is one of the central problems in the economics of the firm. A long and varied literature considers the question of what optimal incentive contracts look like (see Gibbons 1998, for a review). Most of this literature examines the use of "risky" performance measures, and as a result focuses on what Gibbons calls "the much studied trade-off between incentives and insurance." Yet, in most incentive contracts in the real world, risk is not a central issue: with the exception of stock-based plans for top executives, most compensation arrangements in fact impose very little risk on employees. In addition, as Predergast (2000) points out, the data do not confirm the existence of a trade-off between risk and incentives.