[摘要]

本文對新會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則實(shí)施之初公允價(jià)值計(jì)量模式的選用情況進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)對于企業(yè)具有選擇權(quán)的會計(jì)項(xiàng)目（可選擇項(xiàng)目），公允價(jià)值計(jì)量模式的選用程度并不高；同時，公允價(jià)值計(jì)量模式的選用沒有體現(xiàn)出機(jī)會主義的操縱特征。也就是說，公允價(jià)值計(jì)量模式的選用基本正常，監(jiān)管方所擔(dān)憂的機(jī)會主義操縱行為并未出現(xiàn)。這很可能是新會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則對于公允價(jià)值計(jì)量選擇與運(yùn)用的一系列限制性規(guī)定和監(jiān)管部門針對準(zhǔn)則過渡期的監(jiān)管政策發(fā)揮了預(yù)期的效果。

[關(guān)鍵詞] 新會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則 公允價(jià)值 可選擇項(xiàng)目 機(jī)會主義 盈余管理

Is the Choice of Fair Value Measurement Pattern Opportunistic?
——Evidence from the Beginning of China’s New Accounting Standards’ Implementation
Abstract: This paper analyzes empirically the choice of fair value measurement pattern at the beginning of China’s new accounting standards’ implementation. It finds that, for the optional accounting items, fair value measurement pattern is not widely chosen. And the choice doesn’t show a character of opportunism. That’s, the choice is primarily well-balanced without opportunistic manipulations that regulators are afraid of. This condition is probably owing to the effectiveness of the new standards’ limitative rules about the choice and exertion of fair value measurement pattern, and of the supervising policies of concerned departments.
Key words: New Accounting Standards, Fair Value, Optional Item, Opportunism, Earnings Management