隱私與安全 • 國際通信監(jiān)測(cè)

當(dāng)你發(fā)送電子郵件的時(shí)候，你是否知道信息的發(fā)送會(huì)經(jīng)過哪些國家？在這個(gè)世界上，各個(gè)國家都使用互聯(lián)網(wǎng)通過本地設(shè)備的通信來收集情報(bào)，對(duì)于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)用戶來說，無論是個(gè)人還是企業(yè)，這已成為一個(gè)日益重要的問題。這種攔截偵聽在全世界的范圍內(nèi)，都被本國法律規(guī)定是情報(bào)服務(wù)和執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)既定的調(diào)查工具。對(duì)于政府來說，若涉及國家安全的威脅，為了收集情報(bào)而利用一切可利用的資源是很明顯可行的。這種監(jiān)聽正在不斷地?cái)U(kuò)大，并且侵害了通信隱私權(quán)益。越來越多的國家通過立法，預(yù)防在既沒有適當(dāng)?shù)某绦蛳拗埔矝]有嚴(yán)格監(jiān)督的情況下，監(jiān)測(cè)并且收集大量數(shù)據(jù)的行為活動(dòng)。在最壞的情況下，政府打擦邊球甚至無視規(guī)則，也要促進(jìn)情報(bào)的收集工作。
事實(shí)上，通過針對(duì)國際通信的源頭、終點(diǎn)、甚至僅僅是經(jīng)過某個(gè)特定的國家，依據(jù)本國法律的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來對(duì)它進(jìn)行攔截監(jiān)聽，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)通信的特征都表明了它是超越國家性質(zhì)的并且有前途的收集情報(bào)的新途徑。與公共交換電話網(wǎng)（PSTN）不同，公共交換電話網(wǎng)只是發(fā)送目的地到國際網(wǎng)關(guān)，而互聯(lián)網(wǎng)通信并不局限于一國之內(nèi)的范圍，在通信過程中更有可能穿越國家的邊界。在不久之前，世界絕大部分的數(shù)據(jù)流入美國這個(gè)有著世界最大的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)骨干網(wǎng)供應(yīng)商的交換設(shè)備的國家（現(xiàn)在這種情況從某種程度上來說已經(jīng)改變），因此，美國處于一個(gè)能夠控制世界上通過互聯(lián)網(wǎng)傳遞的絕大部分信息的位置。
Privacy and Security
International Communications Surveillance
When you send email, do you know through which countries your communication will be routed ? In a world where countries use the Internet to gather intelligence from communications traffic that transits local facilities, this question has become increasingly important for Internet users—individuals and businesses alike. Such interception is an established investigative tool of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies all over the world provided for by domestic laws. For governments concerned with national security threats, the exploitation of all available sources for intelligence gathering seems obvious. This surveillance is constantly being expanded—to the detriment of communications privacy. Countries are increasingly adopting legislation that provides for preventive surveillance and the massive collection of communications data without either adequate procedural limitations or strict oversight of the activities. In the worst case governments stretch—or even ignore—existing rules in order to facilitate intelligence gathering no matter what.
The fact that Internet traffic is supranational in character offers a promising new avenue for intelligence gathering by targeting international communications originating from, terminating in, or simply passing through a given country and subjecting it to the local standards of legal interception. Unlike the public switched telephony network (PSTN), which delivered only the destined traffic to the international gateways, Internet traffic is not confined to the territory of a state and is more likely to cross borders while in transit. Not long ago the overwhelming majority of data flowed through the U.S., where the world’s top Internet backbone providers’ switching equipment was located (the situation has since changed somewhat). The U.S. was therefore in the position of being able to exercise control over most of the world’s information transmitted via the Internet.
In 2005 the U.S. National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping, a program authorized by the Bush administration, was disclosed. Afterward the government pursued legislation to expand surveillance powers. The short-lived 2007 Protect America Act and its immediate successor, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, permit warrantless interception of international communications during transit through the U.S. and the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. Under the latter U.S. act, the highest level of protection is afforded to purely domestic communications, interception of which would require a warrant whereas international communications (with at least one foreign end-point) are more exposed to surveillance activities. If this logic were to be adopted worldwide, a citizen would have privacy of communications only in the nation in which they had citizenship—and then only if the communications remained fully within the nation’s borders, a situation not always guaranteed when using the decentralized architecture of the Internet. From the perspective of all other countries the same Internet communications would be treated as foreign communications and are thus susceptible to surveillance when on transit through their territories. This privacy threat is not just abstract, but is a realistic assessment in a communications environment powered by Internet technologies.