對(duì)經(jīng)理薪資報(bào)酬中最優(yōu)股權(quán)配置的探討

頁(yè)數(shù) 5 字?jǐn)?shù) 5653

摘 要 論文對(duì)經(jīng)理股權(quán)報(bào)酬和非股權(quán)報(bào)酬的優(yōu)化組合激勵(lì)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了探討。通過(guò)分析建立了組合激勵(lì)的兩階段搏弈模型，通過(guò)搏弈分析和優(yōu)化分析得到了經(jīng)理最優(yōu)薪資報(bào)酬組合和最優(yōu)股權(quán)配置比例。結(jié)合構(gòu)成股權(quán)配置比例的各參數(shù)的含義，探討了它們的變化對(duì)最優(yōu)股權(quán)配置比例的影響，指出了經(jīng)理股權(quán)配置比例設(shè)計(jì)工作中應(yīng)該注意的一些問(wèn)題。

關(guān)鍵詞 股權(quán),薪資,組合,激勵(lì),搏弈

Abstract In this paper, we study a manager’s optimum constitute incentive of share ownership’s salary and non-share ownership’s salary. We establish a two-stage model of game in combination of incentive through analysis. We get the optimum combination of salary and optimum share ownership using game’ analysis and optimum research. We analyze the influence of reference number to the excellent combination. We point out some problems that would notice in designing a manager’s optimum share ownership.
Key word share; salary; combination; incentive; game
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