大股東控制下的關(guān)聯(lián)投資：“效率促進(jìn)”抑或“轉(zhuǎn)移資源”.doc
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大股東控制下的關(guān)聯(lián)投資：“效率促進(jìn)”抑或“轉(zhuǎn)移資源”,共17頁，20000字左右[摘 要] 在我國資本市場上，上市公司與其控股股東之間的關(guān)聯(lián)投資是一種常見的投資現(xiàn)象，也是一種重要的關(guān)聯(lián)交易形式。本文從“效率促進(jìn)”和“轉(zhuǎn)移資源”的視角對我國大股東控制下的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)投資進(jìn)行分析。以2002-2005年的樣本數(shù)據(jù)為依據(jù)，研究結(jié)果表明：上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系...
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[摘 要] 在我國資本市場上，上市公司與其控股股東之間的關(guān)聯(lián)投資是一種常見的投資現(xiàn)象，也是一種重要的關(guān)聯(lián)交易形式。本文從“效率促進(jìn)”和“轉(zhuǎn)移資源”的視角對我國大股東控制下的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)投資進(jìn)行分析。以2002-2005年的樣本數(shù)據(jù)為依據(jù)，研究結(jié)果表明：上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，關(guān)聯(lián)投資并未增加企業(yè)價值，而是成為控股股東轉(zhuǎn)移上市公司資源的一種渠道。進(jìn)一步，當(dāng)上市公司前一年發(fā)實施了IPO或SEO，EBIT較高時，關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；而當(dāng)上市公司ROE為負(fù)或三年平均ROE在6%-8%之間時，關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效顯著正相關(guān)，說明控股股東會根據(jù)上市公司可供轉(zhuǎn)移的資源多寡，通過關(guān)聯(lián)投資將資源轉(zhuǎn)出或轉(zhuǎn)入上市公司，以實現(xiàn)控制權(quán)私利的最大化。
[關(guān)鍵詞] 關(guān)聯(lián)投資；效率促進(jìn)；掏空；支持；治理環(huán)境
The Related Party Investment Controlled by Controlling Shareholder:
Efficiency Enhancing or Resource Transfer
Abstract: Related party investment between listed companies and their controlling shareholders is a frequently occurring phenomenon as well as an important form of related party transactions. From the perspectives of both “efficiency enhancing” and “resources transferring”, this study analyzes related party investments in listed companies under the control of controlling shareholders based on the sample data through 2002 to 2005. Research results indicate a negative relationship between related party investments in listed companies and companies’ performance. Related party investments do not add value to companies, and become an approach for controlling shareholders transferring companies’ resources. Specifically, when a company’s EBIT is high, related party investment is negatively correlated with company’ performance for firms conducting IPO or SEO in the previous year. However, when a company’s ROE is negative, or its average ROE for the past three years is ranged from 6% to 8%, related party investment is significantly correlated with company’ performance. Our research results imply that, based on the amount of manageable resources, controlling shareholders are likely to transfer resources into or out of companies through related party investments for the purpose of self-interests maximization.
Key Words: related party investment; efficiency enhancing; tunneling; propping; governance environment
參考文獻(xiàn)
Aharony .Joseph, Jiwei Wang and Hongqi Yuan,2005, Related party transactions as a direct means for earnings management, working paper.
Cho. M, 1998, Ownership structure, investment and the corporate value, Journal of financial economics, 47,103-121.
Cho, Y.-D., 1995. Company investment decisions and financial constraints: An analysis of a panel of Korean manufacturing firms. Working paper, School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield.
Coase,R.C.,1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics,3:1-44.
Denis D.K. and McConnell J J.,2003, International corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38:1-36.
Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu 2000. Country Legal Environments and Corporate Investment Performance, German economic review, 1 :187–220.
Friedman , E. , S. Johnson , T. Mittton , 2003 , Propping and Tunneling, Journal of Comparative Economics . 31:732-750.
Gertner,R., Scharfstein,D., and Stein,J.,1994, Internal Versus External Capital Markets .The Quarterly Journal of Economics,4:1211-1230.
Gugler, K., and B. B. Yurtoglu, 2003. Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-Out Policy in Germany. European Economic Review 47: 731-758.
Hakan Orbay and B. Burcin Yurtoglu,2006. The impact of corporate governance structures on the corporate investment performance in Turkey corporate governance: an international review, 14 (4 ):349-363,.
H.Orbay, B.B Yurtoglu.2006.The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Corporate Investment Performance in Turkey. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 14 :349-363
Hoshi ,T., A. Kashyap and D.1991. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups Quarterly. Journal of Business and Economics, 106:33-60.
Jian，M., and T.J. Wong，2007, Propping and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions, Working Paper.
Johnson, S., R.,La Porta , F., Lopez-De-Silanes, A., Shleifer , 2000 , Tunnelling, American Economic Review 90:22-27.
Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong, and Tianyu Zhang, 2007. Organizational Structure as a Decentralization Device: Evidence from Corporate Pyramids, working paper.www.ssrn.com.
Khanna,2000. Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence and unanswered questions. European Economic Review.44:748-761
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, 1997, Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets, Harvard Business Review 75(4), 41-51.
Khanna, T and K. Palepu, 2000, Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups, The Journal of Finance 55 (2), 867-892.
McConell ,J. J and H. Servaes,1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of financial economics,27,595-612.
McConell ,J.J. and Muscarella,C.J.1985. Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm, Journal of financial economics,14:339-422
Morck , R., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny,1988, Management ownership and market valuation. Journal of financial economics,20,293-315.
Pagano, M., and A., Roell,1988, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure Agency Costs, Monitoring, and The Decision To Go Public, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.188-225
Stein, Jeremy C.,1997,Internal Capital Market and the Competition for Corporate Resources, Journal of Finance,52,111-133.
Stein,2001.Agency, Information and Corporate Investment, working paper. www.ssrn.com.
Shin H, Park Y.S., 1999 .Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean chaebols. Journal of Corporate Finance,5:169-191.
Shleifer, A., and R.W., 1997.Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance.52:737-783
Williamson,O.E.,1985. the econominc institutions of capitalism, New York,NY: The free press.
Wolfenzon,D.,1999；A theory of pyramidal ownership.working paper, Harvard University.
Woolridge,1988. Competive decline and corporate restructuring: is a myopic stock market to blame? Journal of applied corporate finance,1:26-36.
白重恩等,2005.中國上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的實證研究.經(jīng)濟(jì)研究,2:81-91.
陳曉,王琨.2005.關(guān)聯(lián)交易、公司治理與國有股改革——來自我國資本市場的實證證據(jù).經(jīng)濟(jì)研究. 4:77-97.
樊綱,王小魯.2001（2003，2004）.中國市場化指數(shù)——各地區(qū)市場化相對進(jìn)程年度報告.經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)出版社.
郝穎等,2006.上市公司大股東控制下的資本配置行為研究—基于控制權(quán)收益視角的實證分析.財經(jīng)研究,8:81-93
[摘 要] 在我國資本市場上，上市公司與其控股股東之間的關(guān)聯(lián)投資是一種常見的投資現(xiàn)象，也是一種重要的關(guān)聯(lián)交易形式。本文從“效率促進(jìn)”和“轉(zhuǎn)移資源”的視角對我國大股東控制下的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)投資進(jìn)行分析。以2002-2005年的樣本數(shù)據(jù)為依據(jù)，研究結(jié)果表明：上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，關(guān)聯(lián)投資并未增加企業(yè)價值，而是成為控股股東轉(zhuǎn)移上市公司資源的一種渠道。進(jìn)一步，當(dāng)上市公司前一年發(fā)實施了IPO或SEO，EBIT較高時，關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效呈現(xiàn)負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；而當(dāng)上市公司ROE為負(fù)或三年平均ROE在6%-8%之間時，關(guān)聯(lián)投資與企業(yè)績效顯著正相關(guān)，說明控股股東會根據(jù)上市公司可供轉(zhuǎn)移的資源多寡，通過關(guān)聯(lián)投資將資源轉(zhuǎn)出或轉(zhuǎn)入上市公司，以實現(xiàn)控制權(quán)私利的最大化。
[關(guān)鍵詞] 關(guān)聯(lián)投資；效率促進(jìn)；掏空；支持；治理環(huán)境
The Related Party Investment Controlled by Controlling Shareholder:
Efficiency Enhancing or Resource Transfer
Abstract: Related party investment between listed companies and their controlling shareholders is a frequently occurring phenomenon as well as an important form of related party transactions. From the perspectives of both “efficiency enhancing” and “resources transferring”, this study analyzes related party investments in listed companies under the control of controlling shareholders based on the sample data through 2002 to 2005. Research results indicate a negative relationship between related party investments in listed companies and companies’ performance. Related party investments do not add value to companies, and become an approach for controlling shareholders transferring companies’ resources. Specifically, when a company’s EBIT is high, related party investment is negatively correlated with company’ performance for firms conducting IPO or SEO in the previous year. However, when a company’s ROE is negative, or its average ROE for the past three years is ranged from 6% to 8%, related party investment is significantly correlated with company’ performance. Our research results imply that, based on the amount of manageable resources, controlling shareholders are likely to transfer resources into or out of companies through related party investments for the purpose of self-interests maximization.
Key Words: related party investment; efficiency enhancing; tunneling; propping; governance environment
參考文獻(xiàn)
Aharony .Joseph, Jiwei Wang and Hongqi Yuan,2005, Related party transactions as a direct means for earnings management, working paper.
Cho. M, 1998, Ownership structure, investment and the corporate value, Journal of financial economics, 47,103-121.
Cho, Y.-D., 1995. Company investment decisions and financial constraints: An analysis of a panel of Korean manufacturing firms. Working paper, School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield.
Coase,R.C.,1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics,3:1-44.
Denis D.K. and McConnell J J.,2003, International corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38:1-36.
Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu 2000. Country Legal Environments and Corporate Investment Performance, German economic review, 1 :187–220.
Friedman , E. , S. Johnson , T. Mittton , 2003 , Propping and Tunneling, Journal of Comparative Economics . 31:732-750.
Gertner,R., Scharfstein,D., and Stein,J.,1994, Internal Versus External Capital Markets .The Quarterly Journal of Economics,4:1211-1230.
Gugler, K., and B. B. Yurtoglu, 2003. Corporate Governance and Dividend Pay-Out Policy in Germany. European Economic Review 47: 731-758.
Hakan Orbay and B. Burcin Yurtoglu,2006. The impact of corporate governance structures on the corporate investment performance in Turkey corporate governance: an international review, 14 (4 ):349-363,.
H.Orbay, B.B Yurtoglu.2006.The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Corporate Investment Performance in Turkey. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 14 :349-363
Hoshi ,T., A. Kashyap and D.1991. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups Quarterly. Journal of Business and Economics, 106:33-60.
Jian，M., and T.J. Wong，2007, Propping and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions, Working Paper.
Johnson, S., R.,La Porta , F., Lopez-De-Silanes, A., Shleifer , 2000 , Tunnelling, American Economic Review 90:22-27.
Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong, and Tianyu Zhang, 2007. Organizational Structure as a Decentralization Device: Evidence from Corporate Pyramids, working paper.www.ssrn.com.
Khanna,2000. Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence and unanswered questions. European Economic Review.44:748-761
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, 1997, Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets, Harvard Business Review 75(4), 41-51.
Khanna, T and K. Palepu, 2000, Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups, The Journal of Finance 55 (2), 867-892.
McConell ,J. J and H. Servaes,1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of financial economics,27,595-612.
McConell ,J.J. and Muscarella,C.J.1985. Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm, Journal of financial economics,14:339-422
Morck , R., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny,1988, Management ownership and market valuation. Journal of financial economics,20,293-315.
Pagano, M., and A., Roell,1988, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure Agency Costs, Monitoring, and The Decision To Go Public, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.188-225
Stein, Jeremy C.,1997,Internal Capital Market and the Competition for Corporate Resources, Journal of Finance,52,111-133.
Stein,2001.Agency, Information and Corporate Investment, working paper. www.ssrn.com.
Shin H, Park Y.S., 1999 .Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean chaebols. Journal of Corporate Finance,5:169-191.
Shleifer, A., and R.W., 1997.Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance.52:737-783
Williamson,O.E.,1985. the econominc institutions of capitalism, New York,NY: The free press.
Wolfenzon,D.,1999；A theory of pyramidal ownership.working paper, Harvard University.
Woolridge,1988. Competive decline and corporate restructuring: is a myopic stock market to blame? Journal of applied corporate finance,1:26-36.
白重恩等,2005.中國上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的實證研究.經(jīng)濟(jì)研究,2:81-91.
陳曉,王琨.2005.關(guān)聯(lián)交易、公司治理與國有股改革——來自我國資本市場的實證證據(jù).經(jīng)濟(jì)研究. 4:77-97.
樊綱,王小魯.2001（2003，2004）.中國市場化指數(shù)——各地區(qū)市場化相對進(jìn)程年度報告.經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué)出版社.
郝穎等,2006.上市公司大股東控制下的資本配置行為研究—基于控制權(quán)收益視角的實證分析.財經(jīng)研究,8:81-93
